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I. LIVING WITH THE BLUE RASH  
[Today, t]he land ownership map of the West in many places resembles a 
crazy quilt, without reason or coherent pattern. . . . [O]ften no single 
owner (states, private entities, or the Federal government) owns enough 
contiguous land to allow effective management of land holdings, . . . [and] 
fragmented ownership patterns generate a plethora of disputes over 
access and similar problems.1 
Figure 1. 
Land Ownership in Southeastern Utah 
 
Source: Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration.  
 
 Mapping conventions dictate that state trust lands are shown in blue, and the 
prevalence of blue state sections found on land ownership mapping results in what has 
been referred to as a “blue rash.”2 Figure 1 shows Southeastern Utah and the pervasive 
nature of state trust lands.  
 The bright green areas in Figure 1 represent Wilderness Study Areas (WSAs). 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the WSAs, is obligated to 
ensure that activities within WSAs do “not impair the suitability of such areas for 
preservation as wilderness.”3 Road construction or surface disturbing development is 
prohibited within Wilderness Areas, effectively precluding such development within 
WSAs.4 This preservation mandate invites conflict because as discussed in more detail 
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below, the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA), which 
manages state trust lands within Utah, is obligated to optimize revenue from these lands 
to support public schools and institutions.5 The scope of the conflict is vast – 96,000 
SITLA managed acres are within Wilderness Study Areas, 6  and the Red Rocks 
Wilderness bill7 would capture 817,000 acres of SITLA surface estate within newly 
created Wilderness Areas.8  
 While this paper focuses on examples from Utah, the challenges posed by a 
fragmented landscape and conflicting management objectives are much broader. Across 
the 11 contiguous Western states, state trust lands account for twice the acreage of 
National Parks and trust lands are often interspersed with protected or sensitive lands. 
Inholdings within National Forests, for example, total 14.3 million acres.9 While many 
inholdings are owned by private parties rather than state trust land agencies, the fact 
that National Forest inholdings in the 11 contiguous Western states account for more 
land than all of Maryland and Vermont combined indicates the scope of the problem.  
 
A. FRAGMENTATION 
 Across the 11 contiguous Western states, the federal government controls 362 
million acres (565,400 mi2) of land surface. The BLM is the largest single landowner and 
oversees 172 million surface acres (268,700 mi2) and an even larger mineral estate.10 
The U.S. Forest Service controls 142.4 million acres (222,500 mi2) of land surface.11 
These federal lands are shown in Figure 2 and summarized in Table 1. State trust lands 
are often interspersed, as can be seen in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 2. 
Federal Public Lands 
 
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management. 
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Table 1. 
Land Ownership in Acres (2012) 
 State Trust Lands USFS BLM NPS 
Total State 
Area 
Arizona 9,033,939 10,887,147 12,333,412 2,587,116 72,864,243 
California 304,960 20,620,161 15,577,435 7,717,178 100,387,592 
Colorado 2,693,222 14,419,327 8,286,845 664,013 66,015,890 
Idaho 2,431,819 20,367,277 12,290,691 127,937 53,333,686 
Montana 5,150,294 18,515,274 6,517,197 1,257,973 92,306,919 
Nevada 8,225 5,775,523 47,595,668 763,978 70,750,381 
New Mexico 8,871,722 9,298,320 13,428,855 382,714 77,761,778 
Oregon 1,414,160 16,371,134 15,729,365 197,384 61,930,355 
Utah 3,341,552 8,064,101 22,870,057 2,116,707 54,196,778 
Washington 3,595,925 9,107,632 190,446 1,951,798 42,983,504 
Wyoming 3,551,106 8,992,007 17,171,830 2,330,976 62,237,548 
TOTAL 40,396,924 142,417,903 171,991,801 20,097,774 754,768,674 
Source: Headwaters Economics. 
 
 State trust lands administrators manage 40.4 million acres (63,100 mi2) of 
surface estate across the same landscape.12 In Utah, for example, SITLA manages 3.3 
million acres — a land area larger than Connecticut13 but scattered across the landscape 
in 9,249 individual parcels. 14  Fragmentation and conflicting management objectives 
invite conflict, especially when preservation and development mandates collide. In 
Montana, for example, 1.2 million of the state’s 5.1 million acres of state trust lands are 
land-locked by federal and private lands.15  
 
1. How We Got Here 
 Developing a path out of the quagmire requires an understanding of how we 
came to live in such a fragmented landscape. The short answer is that the federal 
government acquired what is now the “West” through conquest or purchase; treaties 
were signed, federal territories were established, and territories eventually became the 
states that we know today. Railroads, miners, settlers, and newly admitted states were 
granted lands in order to support settlement, development, or essential government 
programs. Under laws intended to dispose of public lands, the federal government 
conveyed vast tracts of federal public lands to corporations and private individuals: 
approximately 270.2 million acres (422,200 mi2) to homesteaders;16 roughly 94.4 million 
acres (147,400 mi2) to railroads;17 about 70.9 million acres (110,700 mi2) to mineral 
claimants,18 and by 1907, approximately 68.2 million acres (106,600 mi2) to returning 
veterans.19 Grants to homesteaders, railroads, miners, and veterans were scattered 
across the landscape, reflecting claimant interest rather than orderly disposition.  
 The federal government also granted extensive lands to newly admitted states, 
though the formula for disposal varied from state to state.20 Under the public land survey 
system, public lands are divided into townships, each of which contains 36 sections; 
each section is normally one square-mile in size (640 acres).21 Townships and sections 
form an invisible grid over the landscape, as shown in Figure 3. Upon admission to the 
Union, Utah received the right to title to sections 2, 16, 32, and 36.22 Lands granted to 
the states were scattered across the landscape to ensure a representative sample of 
resources were available to support state institutions, and to create an incentive to 
develop all parts of the state. Lands that were not granted away remain in federal 
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ownership. The result is the patchwork of ownership evident in Figures 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 3. 
Public Land Survey System 
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Source: Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources, and the Environment. 
 
 Laws disposing of federal lands and resources, created in an era when the 
federal government was land-rich but cash poor,23 set a course for western public land 
management that is often difficult to reconcile with evolving social priorities. Much of the 
tension can be traced to a belief in manifest destiny and reconstruction era laws that 
ushered in westward expansion and dramatic economic growth.24 Their imprint remains 
evident today, and the path these laws charted for a youthful nation is sometimes fraught 
with tension because of evolving realities and changing national priorities.  
 Fragmented ownership would matter little if all landowners and managers 
operated under similar objectives and could harmonize their efforts. Objectives, 
however, are often in conflict.  
 
B. CONFLICTING MANDATES  
 SITLA, like other states’ trust lands administrators, is obligated to manage trust 
lands in the most “prudent and profitable manner possible” to support public schools and 
institutions.25 Specifically, SITLA is directed to “obtain the optimum values from use of 
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trust lands and revenues for the trust beneficiaries, including the return of not less than 
fair market value for the use, sale, or exchange of school and institutional trust assets.”26 
In contrast to SITLA, the BLM operates under a multiple-use, sustained-yield mandate 
that includes protecting sensitive lands.27 BLM’s holdings include 22,870,057 acres in 
Utah, or roughly 42% of the entire state.28 
 Optimizing revenues for trust beneficiaries can be a challenge, as 96,000 SITLA 
acres are within Wilderness Study Areas,29 which are managed under a non-impairment 
standard that precludes most commercial uses.30 An additional 20,220 acres are within 
either the Beaver Dam Wash or Red Cliffs National Conservation Areas, which are 
managed, in part, “to conserve, protect, and enhance for the benefit and enjoyment of 
present and future generations the ecological, scenic, wildlife, recreational, cultural, 
historical, natural, educational, and scientific resources of the National Conservation 
Area.”31 Other federal lands, such as Areas of Critical Environmental Concern,32 are 
often incompatible with resource development and surround many more SITLA acres. 
Preservation proposals threaten to capture even more SITLA land, the most profound 
example being the Red Rocks Wilderness bill,33 which would capture 817,000 acres of 
SITLA surface estate within newly created Wilderness Areas.34 The proposed Greater 
Canyonlands National Monument would capture 151,230 acres of SITLA lands35 and 
significant portions of oil and gas fields that, during 2012, produced over 350,000 barrels 
of oil and 185 million cubic feet of natural gas.36  The more modest Canyonlands 
Completion proposal, which has received much broader support, would still capture 
almost 31,000 acres of SITLA lands.37  
 State trust land inholdings within sensitive federal public lands is a pervasive 
problem across the 11 contiguous Western states. State trust land inholdings are found 
in BLM managed National Monuments in Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, and New 
Mexico, where inholdings collectively total 197,713 acres.38 In addition to Utah, state 
trust land inholdings are found in BLM managed National Conservation Areas in Arizona 
and Idaho, where inholdings total 46,662 acres. 39  While inholdings within National 
Forests are not broken out by ownership type, inholdings are found in National Forest 
Service managed Wilderness areas in each of the 11 contiguous Western states, where 
they total 92,479 acres.40 All told, inholdings in National Forest Service managed lands 
that are managed under a conservation designation total 416,615 acres (651 mi2) across 
this same landscape.41 The inability to both conserve and optimize revenue generation 
from the same landscape invites conflict.  
 
C. THE ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL COSTS OF FRAGMENTATION  
 The scattered nature of many state trust land parcels increases management 
costs and impacts development potential. For example, developing a SITLA parcel that 
is surrounded by federal land necessitates obtaining access across surrounding federal 
land. While SITLA and its lessees are entitled to reasonable access across federal 
lands, the federal government is also able to impose reasonable regulation on access in 
order to minimize impacts to resources. 42  Striking a balance between access and 
protection of competing resource values involves complex discretionary decisions on the 
part of the BLM. These decisions almost assuredly represent “major federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”43 and therefore trigger the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 44  The NEPA compliance process often 
necessitates preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement and costs both time and 
money. Furthermore, at 640 acres, many state trust land parcels are too small to 
develop economically unless they are part of a larger development that includes 
surrounding BLM lands. Where the BLM does not choose to pursue development, trust 
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land beneficiaries may be unable to realize the full economic value of trust assets.  
 The ecological values at stake are equally compelling, including some of the 
most dramatic and ecologically significant lands in the West. The development that trust 
land managers are charged with pursuing threatens Wilderness Study Areas, Areas of 
Critical Environmental Concern, and other sensitive landscapes. Development threatens 
to fragment large blocks of habitat, many of which provide habitat for species protected 
under the Endangered Species Act. 45  Fragmentation could also negatively impact 
habitat connectivity for large mammals that disperse over a broad geographic range.46 
Protecting and increasing landscape-scale connectivity is one of the most common 
recommendations for protecting biodiversity in the face of climate change.47 As the 
National Fish, Wildlife and Plants Climate Adaptation Partnership notes, the ability to 
“[c]onserve, restore, and as appropriate and practicable, establish new ecological 
connections among conservation areas to facilitate fish, wildlife, and plant migration, 
range shifts, and other transitions caused by climate change” is a key adaptation 
strategy.48 Land exchanges are specifically identified as a primary means to affect that 
end.49 
 Consolidating state ownership would facilitate improved planning and leasing for 
revenue-generating economic uses of state trust lands. Consolidating important 
conservation lands would facilitate new protective designations and management 
prescriptions that are often associated with economic growth in adjacent communities.50  
 
II. LAND EXCHANGES   
 Land exchanges have proven useful in “rationalizing” land ownership and 
management.51 While sometimes controversial, land exchanges appear to provide the 
single best opportunity for rationalizing ownership and control over public lands and the 
resources they contain. The transformed landscape could simultaneously facilitate both 
responsible energy development and conservation of sensitive landscapes.  
 The BLM’s land exchange authority is contained in the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA) sections 205 and 206, which set forth the BLM’s authority to 
acquire and dispose of public lands.52 The two key requirements for a FLPMA exchange 
involve determinations that the parcels to be exchanged are of equal value, and that the 
exchange is in the public interest. Congress can bypass FLPMA, enacting legislation 
specifically authorizing a land exchange and exempting the exchange from one or more 
of FLPMA’s requirements, but practical and political realities, as well as past legislative 
exchanges, indicate that some assurance of equal value and public interest will still be 
required. While the fragmentation-reducing benefits of land exchanges are clear, the 
complexities and high transaction costs foil most efforts.  
 
A. KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL-STATE LAND EXCHANGES 
1. Equal Value  
 Under FLPMA, exchanged lands must be in the same state and of equal value,53 
based on nationally approved appraisal standards.54 The appraisal must set forth an 
opinion regarding the market value of the lands. “In estimating market value, the 
appraiser shall: (1) Determine the highest and best use of the property to be appraised;” 
and “(2) Estimate the value of the lands and interests as if in private ownership and 
available for sale in the open market.”55 “Highest and best use means the most probable 
legal use of a property, based on market evidence as of the date of valuation, expressed 
in an appraiser's supported opinion.” 56  In order to equalize the value of parcels 
exchanged, the exchange may incorporate cash payments for up to 25% of the values of 
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the federal lands and interests exchanged.57 Land exchanges under FLPMA can involve 
the surface estate, mineral interests, or both.58  
 Equal value determinations necessitate formal appraisals, which are 
impracticable for consolidating exchanges involving hundreds of parcels and thousands 
of acres. Furthermore, highest and best use determinations do not adequately capture 
nonmarket values: “[a] noneconomic highest and best use, such as conservation, natural 
lands, preservation, or any use that requires the property to be withheld from economic 
production in perpetuity, is not a valid use upon which to estimate market value.”59 This 
prohibition proves especially problematic where federal agencies seek to acquire 
inholdings to advance conservation objectives.  
 The appraisal’s market analysis becomes even more complicated for mineral 
bearing parcels. For such parcels, the analysis must consider the physical 
characteristics of the minerals and the land; the demand for and marketability of the 
minerals, including the access to markets and transportation costs, price, and 
competition; production volume, including rate, production lifespan, and costs; 
environmental considerations including permitting and reclamation costs; taxes, royalty 
rates, capitalization, discount rates, foreseeable technology advances, and a host of 
other considerations that may necessitate complex assessments or development of 
formal mining plans.60 As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals observed: “Many of these 
factors are impossible to predict with reasonable accuracy.”61 And mineral appraisals 
may be needed for literally hundreds of separate parcels. Questionable accuracy and 
high transaction costs, coupled with the risk of litigation, stop most consolidating 
exchange efforts before they begin.  
 Finally, appraisals represent value estimations at a fixed moment in time, while 
the market conditions upon which appraisals depend are subject to constant change. 
The validity period for most appraisals is generally between six months to one year, 
depending on market conditions in the project area. The time required to process an 
exchange varies with workload and exchange complexity, and extended processing 
times can cause the appraisal validity to be called into question. This may create an 
incentive to advance smaller, less complicated exchange proposals rather than the kinds 
of large proposals that would have the greatest benefit.  
 In the face of the challenges involved in consummating consolidating federal-
state exchanges under FLPMA, many exchanges seek congressional authorization.62 
While a legislative exchange can be drafted to avoid many of FLPMA’s requirements, 
and most large exchanges proceed legislatively for just this reason, equal value 
requirements remain a practical reality even where FLPMA does not apply. Legislators 
normally want at least some assurance that the exchange is fair. Common compromises 
are legislative language authorizing less complex valuation methods, applying less 
stringent value equalization requirements, or including a determination that exchanges 
involve lands of equal or approximately equal value.63  
 Alternatively, congressionally authorized exchanges can incorporate revenue 
sharing provisions that reduce the need for formal mineral appraisals. This approach 
shifts the emphasis from putting a precise value on the lands to be conveyed towards 
ensuring that all parties receive a fair share of whatever revenue may eventually be 
generated. Under the Utah Recreational Land Exchange (URLE), for example, the U.S. 
reserved half of any rent and bonus bids as well as a “royalty in the amount that would 
have been received by the Federal Government if the oil shale resources had been 
retained in Federal ownership.”64 The decision to apply revenue sharing only to oil shale 
resources proved to be problematic because the region also contains significant 
quantities of natural gas. Appraisals were needed for conventional hydrocarbon 
resources, and as discussed in more detail below, fluctuations in the price of natural gas 
  8 
reduced the value of the land to be conveyed to the state, forcing major revisions to the 
exchange.  
 Pending legislation that would authorize the relinquishment of state trust lands 
within the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation and the selection of federal public lands 
to replace the lands relinquished extends revenue sharing to all minerals subject to the 
federal Mineral Leasing Act.65 Whether an expanded use of revenue sharing represents 
a viable model remains to be seen. While uncertainty remains, revenue sharing appears 
to represent a powerful tool in the effort to minimize transaction costs while ensuring fair 
outcomes to all parties.  
 
2. Public Interest 
 FLPMA requires that exchanges be in the public interest. Like land valuation and 
equalization requirements, a public interest determination is also a practical necessity for 
legislative exchanges. Under FLPMA, the Secretary must determine that “the public 
interest will be served by making the exchange.”66 FLPMA’s implementing regulations 
require a determination that an exchange serves the public interest be predicated on a 
finding that: 
 
(1) The resource values and the public objectives that the Federal lands 
or interests to be conveyed may serve if retained in Federal ownership 
are not more than the resource values of the non-Federal lands or 
interests and the public objectives they could serve if acquired, and (2) 
The intended use of the conveyed Federal lands will not, in the 
determination of the authorized officer, significantly conflict with 
established management objectives on adjacent Federal lands and Indian 
trust lands.  Such finding and the supporting rationale shall be made part 
of the administrative record.67 
 At a conceptual level, demonstrating that an exchange is in the public interest 
appears fairly straightforward for consolidating federal-state exchanges because of the 
clear benefits that stand to accrue to each party.68 This argument flows from the BLM’s 
regulations, which state that:  
 
When considering the public interest, the authorized officer shall give full 
consideration to the opportunity to achieve better management of Federal 
lands and resources, to meet the needs of State and local residents and 
their economies, and to secure important objectives, including but not 
limited to: protection of fish and wildlife habitats, cultural resources, 
watersheds, and wilderness and aesthetic values; enhancement of 
recreation opportunities and public access; consolidation of lands and/or 
interests in lands, such as mineral and timber interests, for more logical 
and efficient management and development; consolidation of split 
estates; expansion of communities; accommodation of existing or 
planned land use authorizations (§ 254.4(c)(4)); promotion of multiple-use 
values; implementation of applicable Forest Land and Resource 
Management Plans; and fulfillment of public needs.69 
 
 Exchanges that facilitate both sensitive area protection and responsible 
development appear to advance these goals. Conceptual ease, however, is complicated 
by the time and effort required to document consideration of all the factors reflected in 
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applicable regulations. For a FLPMA exchange, the determination is often integrated into 
the NEPA analysis for the proposed exchange. The NEPA documents and public 
interest determination must also consider other legal requirements, such as compliance 
with the Endangered Species Act and the National Historic Preservation Act, that can 
involve considerable time and expense. Furthermore, the identification, valuation, and 
balancing of the resource values associated with the parcels to be acquired and 
conveyed can increase NEPA document complexity, and with it, the time and expense 
required to conclude the public interest determination.  
 When Congress weighs in on a federal-state land exchange, Congress often 
includes a determination that the exchange is in the public interest.70 A congressional 
determination does not, however, eliminate requirements to comply with substantive and 
procedural requirements contained in statutes such as the Endangered Species Act and 
the National Historic Preservation Act. A congressional public interest determination, 
while potentially expediting an exchange, may also reduce opportunities for public 
involvement. And of course public interest determinations may be met with skepticism, 
especially where there has been a history of disproportionate windfalls to one party.71  
 Calls for a formal presumption that consolidating federal-state land exchanges 
are in the public interest respond, at least in part, to the subjectivity inherent in the 
determination.72 Whether improvements in efficiency outweigh the benefits resulting from 
careful and transparent deliberation is an open question, and likely to generate strong 
opinions by all parties. At present, the requirements associated with the public interest 
determination appear less problematic than the requirements associated with the equal 
value determination, but these requirements are still likely to result in significant time and 
expense to the parties involved. 
 
B. ADDITIONAL BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL FEDERAL-STATE EXCHANGES  
 Federal-state land exchanges that consolidate lands and reduce fragmentation 
can simultaneously facilitate both responsible resource development and protection of 
sensitive landscapes. Despite the clear benefit to a wide range of interests, such 
exchanges remain rare. Having already discussed the transaction costs associated with 
land and resource valuation, this section explores other reasons why mutually beneficial 
exchanges are so difficult to effectuate.  
 
1. Resource Values 
 Oil and natural gas are the most common mineral resources extracted from 
federal and state lands. These resources are sold on commodity markets where prices 
fluctuate based on factors beyond the producers’ control. In 1998, for example, West 
Texas intermediate crude oil sold for an average annual price of $14.42 per barrel; a 
decade later, the price had increased almost 700% to $99.67 per barrel.73 Natural gas 
markets are equally volatile, with the average annual wellhead price hitting $7.97 per 
thousand cubic feet in 2008 but falling to $2.66 per thousand cubic feet in 2012.74 See 
Figure 4.  
 Market volatility can directly impact land and resource value, as it did with the 
Utah Recreational Land Exchange Act. The Act authorized the BLM to convey 35,609 
acres of developable public land to Utah in return for 45,826 acres of sensitive state 
lands located near National Parks and along the Colorado River. 75  The initial 
authorization was subject to modification as needed to equalize the value of the lands 
exchanged. Appraisals and exchange documentation took four and a half years, and 
between the Act’s passage and exchange consummation, the price of natural gas fell 
precipitously, reducing the value of the federal lands to be conveyed to the State by 
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more than $10 million. To ensure an equal value exchange, 36 state parcels totaling 
20,273 acres were dropped from the exchange and will not receive the federal 
protections that all parties initially envisioned.76  
 
Figure 4. 
Domestic Oil and Gas Market Prices 1990-2012 
 
Data from the United States Energy Information Administration.  
 
 Changes in technology can also frustrate value equalization efforts. The 
combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has enabled the energy 
industry to access and produce oil and natural gas much more economically, lowering 
the per-unit cost of production while making previously unprofitable reserves 
economically recoverable. Such changes can radically impact the value of mineral 
resources underlying state and federal lands, playing havoc with efforts to equalize 
values.  
 Unconventional resources such as oil shale are even more troubling. For 
example, a 2010 U.S. Geological Survey report estimated in-place oil shale resources of 
the Green River Formation within the Uinta Basin of Utah and Colorado at over 1.3 
trillion barrels.77 To put that into perspective, Saudi Arabia has approximately 265 billion 
barrels of proven oil reserves.78 At almost 5 times the size of Saudi Arabia’s proven 
reserves, the potential resources within the Green River Formation are staggering. 
However, commercial scale oil shale to liquid fuel production does not exist anywhere in 
the world. To value oil shale bearing lands based on the oil equivalency of in-place 
resources ignores the unknown cost of production and uncertain rate of recovery, 
potentially dramatically overstating the economic value of the resource. However, simply 
assuming that since oil shale will never be produced commercially because it has not 
been profitably developed to date risks dramatic underestimation of economic value. 
Inaccurate assumptions could create huge winners and losers, and the risk of loss 
resulting from faulty assumptions stands as a major barrier to successful exchanges.  
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 While it is unrealistic to expect that market and technological uncertainty can be 
eliminated, reducing uncertainty can help minimize transaction costs and the risk to all 
parties. Minimizing the likelihood that appraisals will require revision or that NEPA 
documents will need supplementation reduces the likelihood that the time and expense 
incurred completing these steps will inhibit mutually beneficial exchange efforts. 
Likewise, since the risk of entering into an exchange that subsequently results in a 
windfall to one party is a strong psychological barrier to exchange finalization, minimizing 
this risk may facilitate progress towards exchange consummation. Revenue sharing 
provisions may be a means of addressing some of these challenges.  
 
2. Existing Revenue Distributions  
 Environmental matters aside, a land exchange involving federal and state trust 
lands at first appears to be a simple matter of ascertaining the value of the lands 
involved, and then ensuring that the lands conveyed by the federal government to the 
trust lands administration are equal in value to the lands conveyed by the trust lands 
administration to the federal government. It is not that simple.  
 Under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA),79 states are entitled to roughly half of the 
revenue from mineral development occurring on federal lands,80 and mineral revenue 
payments to states are “directed giving priority to those subdivisions of the State socially 
or economically impacted by development of minerals . . . for (i) planning, (ii) 
construction and maintenance of public facilities, and (iii) provision of public services.”81 
The equal value federal-trust lands exchange shown in Figure 5 therefore affects 
interests in future revenue depicted in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 5. 
Simple Federal-Trust Lands Exchange  
 
Source: Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources, and the Environment. 
 
Figure 6. 
Revenue Distribution for Federal-Trust Lands Exchanges 
 
Source: Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources, and the Environment. 
 
 An equal value federal-state exchange would pose little difficulty if both parcels 
have the same likelihood of development. A problem arises when the federal 
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government seeks to obtain lands for conservation purposes, and these lands contain 
valuable mineral resources that would likely have been developed had the land 
remained in state ownership. Such scenarios are common because the threat of 
developing a mineral-rich trust lands parcel, deemed better suited for conservation or 
surrounded by federal lands managed for conservation purposes, motivates most federal 
acquisitions. While the federal government may be willing to forego potential future 
revenue in return for conservation benefits, that decision impacts a potential source of 
future revenue for local governments. The loss of that potential revenue stream will 
invariably raise a concern for the communities that will face the shortfall. Of course the 
income forgone is speculative revenue since there are no guarantees that the parcel 
would have been developed, but it is likely to raise concerns all the same. 
 At this point it is worth noting that the federal government is under no obligation 
to retain land in federal ownership.82 If the federal government chose to dispose of public 
lands through sale or grant, no MLA revenue from development occurring after federal 
disposal would accrue to either the state or local governments.83 Accordingly, as a 
purely legal matter, the federal government is likely free to exchange federal lands 
without regard to the impact on MLA revenue. However, as a practical matter, an 
exchange that reduces the potential for future federal mineral revenue production, half of 
which is directed to local governments, may founder for lack of local support.  
 In addition to questions regarding the amount of MLA revenue that would be 
directed to local governments, federal-state exchanges raise difficult questions regarding 
how MLA revenue would be distributed among those governments. Since mineral 
revenue derived from federal land development is returned to the counties where the 
development occurred, an exchange that shifts development from one county to another 
also shifts revenue between counties, even if the exchange does not result in a change 
in the net amount of revenue produced. Again, counties that suspect they will loose 
future revenue as a result of a federal-state exchange are likely to be exchange skeptics. 
 There are several ways to protect the potential state revenue stream, but all are 
problematic. As a practical matter, a federal-state land exchange is unlikely to succeed 
unless it is fair to all parties involved – that is, no party can give up more than it receives. 
State and local governments also are unlikely to support exchanges that eliminate their 
potential to receive a share of the revenue generated from mineral development on 
federal lands within the county’s borders, effectively requiring either an increased 
contribution from trust lands administrators or the federal government. 
 The federal government cannot provide additional value because to do so would 
violate FLPMA’s equal value requirement.84 While legislative exchanges are likely to 
include less rigid equal value requirements, the perception that the federal government 
fails to obtain a fair return will almost certainly generate strong public opposition to 
legislation giving more than equal value to states.85  
 Provision of additional value by state trust land managers is equally problematic. 
In Utah, state trust lands administrators owe a fiduciary duty to trust beneficiaries, 
obligating them to “manage the lands and revenues generated from the lands in the 
most prudent and profitable manner possible.”86 “Trust lands administrators must be 
concerned with both income for current beneficiaries and the preservation of trust assets 
for future beneficiaries, which requires a balancing of short and long-term interests so 
that long-term benefits are not lost in the effort to maximize short-term gains.”87 The 
precise requirements of the duty vary from state to state depending on the language 
contained in the federal enabling acts offering land upon admission to the Union, state 
constitutions accepting federal grants, and state statutes regarding trust lands 
administration. 88  Subtle difference aside, the common thread is that trust lands 
administrators cannot give up valuable trust assets without obtaining fair market value in 
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return.89 Therefore, if state trust lands administrators choose to give up value in order to 
ensure that state and local governments maintain a source of revenue, the trust lands 
administrators would be in breach of their fiduciary duties and the exchange would be in 
legal jeopardy.  
 The state and its subdivisions could agree to a reduction in potential revenue in 
order to maintain exchange viability. Reducing landscape fragmentation will likely 
produce new economic opportunities, and increases in tax revenue attributed to new 
activity may offset some or all of the potential mineral revenue foregone. However, while 
some reduction seems reasonable, it is unlikely that either the legislature or local 
governments will agree to a federal-state exchange that they perceive to be 
economically unadvantageous.  
 While fuller consideration of environmental values appears appropriate and 
desirable, 90  existing legal requirements preclude non-market value consideration. 91 
Therefore, to be fair to all, the parties must agree to discount the value of the lands and 
resources to reflect the likelihood of development. For example, where state trust lands 
containing valuable mineral resources are surrounded by federal lands that are 
managed to protect scenic or wilderness related values, the smaller size of trust lands 
parcels and the management requirements associated with surrounding federal lands 
may reduce the likelihood of development. The question becomes how much to discount 
the value of trust lands by. Subjectivity in these determinations may create some room 
for flexibility in equal value negotiations.  
 Another option is to include other valuable consideration in the exchange. Such 
consideration could create flexibility if the parties are afforded deference to the value 
they attach to it. For example, the State of Utah and the federal government 
consummated one of the largest exchanges ever in 1998, eliminating over 452,000 
acres of state trust lands inholdings from National Parks, National Forests, Indian 
Reservations, and the newly created Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.92 
In return, the state received a $50,000,000 cash payment, a $13,000,000 interest in coal 
revenue from development on federal lands, 156 million tons of coal, and over 117,000 
acres of federal land.93 The State of Utah, as part of the exchange agreement, also 
agreed to seek dismissal of an ongoing lawsuit over valuation of parcels contained in a 
prior land exchange bill.94 The value attached to the litigation foregone is somewhat 
subjective, and a similar agreement to drop ongoing litigation in association with an 
exchange agreement may provide valuable flexibility to future exchange efforts.  
 
3. Continuing Claims to Federal Lands  
 Assuming that the federal and state governments are successful in negotiating 
an exchange that consolidates a block of federal land that can then be managed for 
conservation purposes, any outstanding mechanism that can fragment that newly 
consolidated landscape, whether real or perceived, threatens exchange completion. The 
continued existence of non-federal inholdings can pose such a threat. For purposes of 
this analysis, we assume that private inholdings can be eliminated through federal-
private exchanges. We also assume that all existing state and state trust lands 
inholdings are removed as part of the exchange. While this appears to resolve the 
problem, the continued existence of unclaimed “quantity grants” could cause uncertainty 
and generate resistance within federal agencies, if such grants are not understood.  
 When the Western states were admitted to the Union, they received the right to 
title to designated sections of land within each township.  In Utah’s case, the newly 
created state received sections 2, 16, 32, and 36 in each township.95 We refer to these 
as section grants. Utah, like its sister states, also received the right to select hundreds of 
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thousands of acres in support of specific objectives such as to fund construction of the 
State Capitol.96 We refer to these as quantity grants. The right of selection for quantity 
grants was established without restriction or regard to the value of the lands selected, 
though mineral lands are excluded from selection.97 While most quantity grants were 
selected many years ago, SITLA retains approximately 2,800 to 5,000 acres of as of yet 
unselected quantity grants; the quantity is in dispute. Because quantity grants are not 
tied to value, SITLA has a strong incentive to claim lands with the highest value lands 
possible. SITLA will therefore likely claim lands only near urban areas where land values 
are generally higher. SITLA has little incentive to seek inholdings within areas otherwise 
managed for conservation purposes.  
 A similar though less pressing concern exists with respect to in-lieu lands. These 
are lands that state trust lands administrators are entitled to select in-lieu of section 
grants that had been conveyed out of federal ownership before they could be conveyed 
to the state.98 In-lieu land selection is intended to “make the States whole for the loss of 
value resulting from the unavailability of the originally designated cross section of lands 
within the State.” 99  Accordingly, mineral lands are generally unavailable for in-lieu 
selection except as indemnity for mineral lands that would have been conveyed to the 
state but for prior reservation or conveyance to a third party.100 Similarly, the Secretary of 
the Interior can classify lands as available for in-lieu selection in order to avoid selection 
resulting in conveyance of grossly disparate value to the state.101 This limitation appears 
to reduce federal concern that a state may seek to acquire disproportionately valuable 
lands through in-lieu selection. The administrative process involved in in-lieu selection 
also provides federal land managers with increased voice in the selection process, 
creating an opportunity to resolve concerns or disagreements that is lacking with respect 
to quantity grants.  
 
III. FUTURE RESEARCH REGARDING POTENTIAL REFORMS 
 The goal of this paper was to identify opportunities and challenges and begin a 
conversation about alternative courses of action. Given the potential for mutually 
beneficial federal-state land exchanges, reform opportunities represent a fruitful area for 
future research.  
 As noted earlier, regulations applicable to federal land exchanges preclude 
consideration of non-market values. Yet a key motivator behind many large federal-state 
land exchanges is the removal of trust lands inholdings from sensitive landscapes, 
thereby removing the threat of development and facilitating conservation oriented 
management across a broader landscape. Valuation reform allowing consideration of 
ecosystem services and non-extractive uses could lead to more complete and accurate 
valuation.102   
 In the face of the challenges involved in concluding consolidating federal-state 
exchanges under FLPMA, many exchanges seek congressional authorization. 
Legislation can authorize less complex valuation methods or find that exchanges involve 
lands that are equal in value. Alternatively, congressionally authorized exchanges can 
shift the focus from valuation and equalization to the underlying goal, ensuring that 
neither the state nor the federal government is unjustly enriched by the transaction. The 
Utah Recreational Land Exchange and Uintah and Ouray Relinquishment and Selection 
proposals discussed above are potential models for broader reforms. Future research 
should evaluate these efforts to determine whether they produce the intended results 
and seek to develop models that improve both efficiency and efficacy.  
 While revenue sharing provides a valuable tool, especially when the exchange 
involves resources that are subject to significant uncertainty or market volatility, revenue 
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sharing does not resolve the problems posed by the MLA’s ongoing commitment to 
return revenue generated from development on federal lands to the communities where 
that development occurred. Utah has created a Land Exchange Distribution Account,103 
which directs a percentage of the proceeds from development on lands acquired through 
land exchanges back to the counties that lost federal lands as part of that exchange.104 
This account and associated statute may provide a useful model for other states. 
Regardless of how reform efforts proceed, careful attention should be paid to unintended 
changes to revenue distribution, and the consequences such changes portend.  
 Finally, trust (or the lack thereof) stands as one of the most significant barriers to 
exchange efforts. Closing out remaining quantity grants and in-lieu selections as part of 
a consolidating federal-state exchange could help secure support for mutually beneficial 
exchanges. Public support is especially important, particularly where past exchange 
efforts have stalled because of a lack of trust or fears of an inequitable outcome. 
Overcoming these challenges will necessitate careful process design, meaningful public 
involvement, and transparency.  
 Despite the challenges ahead, we are optimistic that, with appropriate reforms, 
federal-state land exchanges can reduce management fragmentation and conflicts. The 
ecological and economic benefits consolidating exchanges justify a concerted reform 
effort.  
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